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INTRODUCTION 
Defendant-Appellant William Clifford Bartley 
("Bartley") presents this reply brief to address matters raised 
in the Brief of Respondent dated May 30, 1989, and in the 
Supplemental Authorities submitted by the State on June 1, 1989. 
The State, in the Supplemental Authorities, raises an issue of 
constitutional dimension which should be considered as a matter 
of fairness and justice to Bartley. That issue is whether 
Bartley's constitutional right against self incrimination was 
violated when the Court permitted cross examination of Bartley*s 
codefendant, Jay Charles Wade, about the post arrest silence of 
both defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State has accurately set forth the facts in its 
Statement of Facts, with the following exceptions: 
1. The State's description of the stop of the 
defendants implies that the sheriff and his deputy smelled the 
drip gas before the stop occurred. It is clear from the 
transcript that they smelled nothing until after the arrest. 
Motion Tr. at 11: 
Q. (Counsel for Wade) When the vehicle that was 
driven by Mr. Wade approached, where were you 
parked? What did you observe about that vehicle? 
A. (Sheriff Wright) It was towing a tank on a 
trailer, and it was lugged down and going very 
slowly. 
Q. You didn't notice anything else about it? 
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A. I was standing to one side of it. I told him 
to go to the police car. I noticed a smell later. 
That was a crude oil smell. Meanwhile, the other 
vehicles were coming down towards me, I thought. 
Motion Tr. at 28: 
Q. (Counsel for Wade) You observed the clear 
liquid after you placed these men under arrest; is 
that right? 
A. (Sheriff Wright) I think that's when it was. 
Trial Tr. I at 67-68: 
Q. (Prosecutor during direct examination.) Did 
you place the individuals in custody? 
A. (Sheriff Wright) Yes. 
Q. And you placed them—Did you do something to 
secure them, their persons? 
A. I believe they were handcuffed, yes. 
Q, And placed in the patrol car? 
A. Yes. Kirby did that. 
Q. Did you have occasion to observe or go back 
and look at these tanks and trucks? 
A. Right then I just walked along and slapped 
them. But then I said, "You better get the hell 
down here. The other outfit is trying to get away 
from us, and we better head them off down by 
Perkins Ranch." We were three minutes behind them 
at that time and probably going south, and we had-
Q. During that period of time, did you observe 
anything with regard to those materials or 
anything in regard to those vehicles and tanks? 
A. I had the impression they weren't all full. 
There was what I would associate a smell with 
them, and we also had that smell in the car when 
we put those people in there. 
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Q. Can you identify or tell us what kind of 
smell it was? 
A. It's a rank odor that I associate with crude 
oil or drip gas or the oil well base product. 
Trial Tr. II at 131: 
Q. (Prosecutor during direct examination.) Did 
you have occasion to inspect or see or observe 
anything with regard to the contents of the tanks? 
A. (Deputy Kirby) In the bank of Mr. Wadefs 
pickup there was a tank. On the trailer he was 
pulling was three tanks. I believe it was the 
first tank—was approximately half-full. And I 
opened the valve on it. 
Q. This is at the time of the stop? 
A. This is a little bit later. This is after 
Mr.—I believe after Mr. Bartley was arrested. We 
started to kind of looking the vehicles over. 
Q. That's what I was wondering. When you opened 
the valve, what did you observe? 
A. There was a liquid came out. 
Q. Can you tell us anything you remember of what 
you remember about the liquid? 
A. It stunk. It reminded me of propane, of 
butane. 
2. The State describes the area in which Bartley was 
driving as an oil field. Bartley was driving on a road that runs 
from Dove Creek, Colorado, to Montezuma Creek, Utah, intersecting 
with a road from Blanding, Utah. This was not a dead-end road to 
an oil well. The road serves farms, ranches, the Navajo 
Reservation, and the oil field. (Trial Tr. I at 58-59). 
3. The State says that the state criminologist 
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compared samples of the liquid on Bartley's clothes with a sample 
of drip gas from the Wintershall tank and found them comparable. 
What the criminologist actually compared were the residues from 
the Wintershall tank after all volatile substances had evaporated 
and the residue from a stain extracted from Bartleyfs clothes 
with a solvent. 
Trial Tr. II at 235: 
Q. You're not actually comparing what was 
originally on the jacket or in the bottle? 
A. No. No. It would be much too involved. I 
wouldn't expect to find it there. 
4. The State also does not mention that the state 
criminologist received a sample from the Wintershall tank from 
which the material "had volatilized" (Trial Tr. II at 234) and in 
which there was nothing to be compared. (Trial Tr. II at 234). 
No explanation was ever offered as to why the first sample, from 
which everything had volatilized, had no residue to compare, 
while there was a residue from the second sample. 
The State accurately cites the record in its 
Supplemental Authorities filed on June 1, 1989, with respect to 
the State's cross examination of Wade about his post arrest 
silence. Bartley adds the following facts concerning that 
testimony: 
1. Wade did not testify during direct examination 
mat ne had not been given an opportunity before or after his 
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arrest to explain what he had been doing. 
2. Wade's testimony about any statements to the 
sheriff and his deputy was consistent with their testimony about 
those statements (Trial Tr. I at 78, Trial Tr. IV at 350). 
3. Wade was Bartleyfs only witness as to what they 
had been doing that night. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THAT DEFENDANTS MIGHT HAVE BEEN STOPPED 
WITHOUT A ROADBLOCK DOES NOT VALIDATE THE STOP. 
The State appears to concede that the sheriff and his 
deputy did set up a roadblock on the night in question. It then 
passes off Bartley's roadblock argument by claiming that Bartley 
could have been stopped anyway based on a reasonable suspicion. 
There is no evidence that the sheriff actually had a 
reasonable suspicion. There is also no evidence that Bartley 
would or could have been stopped without a roadblock. 
Furthermore, if Bartley is not permitted to challenge the 
sheriff's illegal roadblock, it is likely that no one else will. 
If the State's argument is accepted, police will be virtually 
free to set up roadblocks at will. Those not arrested will not 
challenge the roadblocks and the police will almost always 
succeed in constructing, after the fact, a reasonable suspicion 
to justify their actions. 
II. THERE WAS NEITHER REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR 
THE STOP NOR PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ARREST. 
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When the sheriff stopped Bartley, he knew 1) that there 
had been thefts of drip gas from tanks in the area and 2) that it 
was late at night. Those facts cannot justify a stop. State v. 
Baumgartel, 762 P.2d 2 (Utah App. 1988). In an area of farms and 
ranches, the presence of "farm size" tanks on pickups and 
trailers suggests no illegal activity. Bartley was not driving 
on a dead end road leading to an oil well. He was driving on a 
major county road serving farms, ranches, the Navajo Reservation, 
and oil fields. 
Even accepting, which Bartley does not, the idea that 
the presence of tanks on the pickups and trailers added an 
additional element sufficient to generate reasonable suspicion, 
not even the State contends that the sheriff had probable cause 
until after the discovery of drip gas in the tanks. However, the 
record is clear that this discovery occurred only after the 
arrest. It therefore cannot be used to justify the arrest. 
State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988) (evidence gained 
after stop cannot be used to justify stop). 
III. BARTLEY WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION. 
To its credit, the State has raised an issue that, 
though raised by Bartley at trial, was not raised by Bartley in 
his docketing statement or appeal brief. That issue has a 
constitutional dimension, and the State concedes that it should 
be addressed at this time. 
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The State obtained, without objection, the testimony of 
Sheriff Wright that neither Bartley nor Wade had made any 
statements at the time of arrest, except that they knew of no 
third vehicle (Trial Tr. I at 78). That testimony was given 
early in the trial, with little emphasis to impress it in the 
jurors1 minds. However, during cross examination of Wade, the 
State interrogated him over objection from counsel for Bartley 
and Wade, concerning his post arrest silence (Trial Tr. IV at 
349-353). That interrogation was lengthy and the prosecutor's 
mostly rhetorical questions clearly implied that Wade and Bartley 
said nothing to explain their actions because they either had not 
yet worked out a believable story or knew their story would not 
check out. 
The trial court approved this interrogation on the 
grounds that Wade had waived his right against self incrimination 
by taking the stand. That ruling was clearly error. Doyle v. 
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). It is also clear from the transcript 
that this cross examination was devastating to both defendants. 
Although Bartleyfs right against self incrimination was 
not directly violated by this interrogation, his right was 
nevertheless clearly affected. Wade was his witness. Wade was 
also his codefendant and the clear implications in the 
prosecutor's questions were as applicable to Bartley as to Wade. 
The questions were as much a comment on Bartleyfs post arrest 
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silence as on Wadefs. Furthermore, the treatment of Wade by the 
Court and the prosecutor was an important factor in the decision 
of Bartley not to testify in his own defense. 
The State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that this 
error was harmless. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987). 
That it cannot do. Wade and Bartley were prepared to present 
believable versions of the events of that night. Their 
explanation was not fanciful or imaginary. They were cut short 
when the prosecutor's treatment of Wade seriously compromised him 
as a witness and dissuaded Bartley from even taking the stand. 
Were it not for this erroneous ruling by the trial court, there 
is a real possibility that the defendants would have been able to 
generate a reasonable doubt in the jurors1 minds. 
This is not a case where comment on post arrest silence 
was necessary to clarify discrepancies regarding defendants1 
opportunity to provide information to the authorities. See State 
v. Sorrels, 642 P.2d 373 (Utah 1982). That opportunity was not 
an issue in this case. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS EVIDENTIARY 
RULINGS WERE PREJUDICIAL. 
The State asserts that Bartley's possession of a gun 
was somehow relevant to the circumstances of the crime and 
arrest. It cites State v. Gibson, 565 P.2d 783 (Utah 1977), 
where the rape was so closely tied into the picture of the crime 
and the defendant's motive for murder as to be inseparable. The 
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State then offers no explanation of how Bartley's possession of a 
hand gun in any way related to the theft. 
The State justifies admission of evidence concerning 
disappearance of the vehicles and tanks to explain the absence of 
evidence. It cites no authority for the proposition that the 
State is entitled to explain why its evidence is sparse. If the 
State is correct that there was ample other evidence of guilt, 
there was no need to explain. The jury is entitled to hear all 
evidence that is admissible, but there is no need to explain 
every absence of evidence, particularly when the explanation 
carries prejudicial overtones. 
Evidence of the commission of other crimes must be used 
tfith extreme caution. State v. Holder, 699 P.2d 583 at 584 (Utah 
1984). In this case the prosecutor and the trial court threw 
caution to the wind. The cumulative effect of this evidence was 
to portray Bartley as a "bad actor." After the State's 
determined efforts to introduce this evidence, it cannot now be 
permitted to say that the evidence was not important. 
. V. THE COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE APPROPRIATENESS 
OF APPOINTING OTHER COUNSEL TO REPRESENT BARTLEY. 
Counsel for Bartley was appointed little more than a 
nonth before the trial. Though he believes his preparation for 
trial was adequate, the record shows that his performance at 
trial was not perfect. He failed to object initially to 
testimony of Bartley's post arrest silence (Trial Tr. I at 78). 
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His failure to file a motion in limine with respect to the 
introduction of evidence about Bartley's possession of a hand gun 
and the disappearance of the vehicles and tanks meant the jurors 
would hear all objections (Trial Tr. I at 66, 78-82). The 
consequence of this is that the objections may have served only 
to focus the jury's attention on those matters. He failed to 
initially address on appeal the trial court's clearly erroneous 
ruling permitting cross examination of Wade concerning his post 
arrest silence. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, counsel for 
Bartley was involved in Bartley's decision not to take the stand. 
That decision was affected 1) by the treatment given Wade by the 
prosecutor and the Court during his cross examination, and 2) by 
the belief of Bartley's counsel that evidence of Bartley's prior 
felony theft conviction, though ostensibly introduced to impeach 
his credibility, would inevitably lead the jury to conclude that 
Bartley is a thief, 
Bartley has already addressed the first reason for that 
decision. With respect to the second reason, it has now become 
clear that Bartley's present counsel did not correctly understand 
the law. Although the Utah Supreme Court had stated that theft 
obviously implies dishonesty under the old rules of evidence, 
State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 at 34 (Utah 1984), this Court has 
since ruled that robbery, State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 
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1988) and theft, State v. Brown, 105 U.A.R. 25 (Utah App. 1989) 
are not necessarily crimes of dishonesty under the new rules of 
evidence, and will not necessarily be admissible for impeachment 
purposes. 
While Bartley!s present counsel believes his 
representation of Bartley has been adequate, though not 
brilliant, it is appropriate that this Court consider appointing 
other counsel to address the adequacy of Bartley!s 
representation. 
CONCLUSION 
Bartleyfs conviction should be reversed. The Court 
should also consider whether other counsel should be appointed 
for Bartley to address the adequacy of his representation by 
present counsel. 
DATED this ZIV-xddiY of June, 1989. 
^f^/L 4y/^ 
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Attorney for Defendant 
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Monticello, Utah 84535 
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